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The correct answer is D.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that the client may not remove the light fitting because it is likely to be a fixture due to the high degree of attachment. In property law, whether an item is a fixture (part of the land) or a chattel (personal property) depends on two tests: the degree of annexation and the purpose of annexation. The degree of annexation refers to how permanently the item is attached to the property. In this case, the light fitting is held to the ceiling by only three small screws, indicating a slight degree of attachment. The purpose of annexation considers whether the item was intended to be a permanent improvement to the property or simply for the better enjoyment of the item itself. Since the light fitting was made by the client’s late father, it likely has personal significance, suggesting it was not intended as a permanent fixture. Therefore, the light fitting is likely a chattel rather than a fixture. Option A incorrectly concludes that the light fitting is a fixture due to a high degree of attachment, making it incorrect.

B. This is wrong. This option asserts that removing the light fitting constitutes a breach of an implied term of the contract because the room will be unlit when the new owners move in. However, there is no general implied term in property sale contracts requiring the seller to leave light fittings or to ensure rooms are lit after completion. Unless specifically stated in the contract, sellers are not obligated to leave behind chattels. As the light fitting is likely a chattel and not mentioned in the contract, the client is not breaching any implied term by removing it. Therefore, Option B is incorrect as it misstates the obligations implied in the contract.

C. This is wrong. This option claims that any item within a property is permanently part of the land and must not be removed. This is an overgeneralisation and incorrect statement of the law. Not all items within a property are considered fixtures; many are chattels that the owner can remove. The determination depends on the degree and purpose of annexation. Since the light fitting is likely a chattel due to its slight attachment and personal significance, it can be removed. Option C is incorrect because it inaccurately states that all items within a property are permanently part of the land.

D. This is correct. This option states that the client may remove the light fitting because it is likely to be a chattel due to the slight degree of attachment. The light fitting is held by three small screws, indicating minimal attachment to the property. Additionally, the purpose of annexation appears to be for the client’s personal enjoyment rather than to permanently improve the property, especially given its sentimental value as it was made by the client’s late father. Under the law, when an item is lightly affixed and intended for personal use or enjoyment, it is considered a chattel and can be removed by the owner before completion if not mentioned in the contract. Therefore, Option D correctly reflects the legal position.

E. This is wrong. This option suggests that any item with sentimental value is always removable. While sentimental value may support the argument that an item is a chattel, sentimental value alone does not determine whether an item is a fixture or a chattel. The legal test focuses on the degree and purpose of annexation, not solely on sentimental value. An item with sentimental value could still be considered a fixture if it is significantly attached to the property and intended to be a permanent improvement. Therefore, Option E is incorrect because it oversimplifies the legal criteria by relying solely on sentimental value.

The correct answer is C. Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. The expectation measure of damages aims to put the claimant in the position they would have been in had the contract been properly performed. This typically involves compensating for the difference in value between what was contracted for and what was delivered. In this case, the tiles supplied (with the flag of Uruguay) may not differ significantly in market value from the tiles ordered (with the Greek flag). Therefore, expectation damages calculated based on the difference in value may be nominal or insufficient to enable the restaurant owner to rectify the problem. B. This is wrong. Reliance damages are intended to reimburse the claimant for expenses incurred in reliance on the contract, effectively putting them back in the position they were in before the contract was made. In this scenario, the restaurant owner does not seek to recover pre-contractual expenses or costs incurred due to entering the contract. Instead, the owner wants the tiles to be replaced to achieve the desired aesthetic for the restaurant. Therefore, reliance damages are not the appropriate measure here. C. This is correct. The cost of cure measure of damages allows the claimant to recover the cost of remedying the defect—in this case, the cost of removing the incorrect tiles and installing the correct ones featuring the Greek flag. This measure is appropriate when the breach involves defective or inadequate performance, and the cost of cure is reasonable and proportionate to the benefit obtained. In the landmark case of Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344, the court held that where the contractual objective is important to the claimant, and the cost of cure is not out of proportion to the benefit, the claimant can recover the cost of rectifying the breach. Given that the correct flag design is significant for the thematic decor of the Greek restaurant, the court is likely to award damages based on the cost of cure. D. This is wrong. Loss of amenity damages are awarded when the claimant suffers a loss of enjoyment or satisfaction due to the breach, and the cost of cure is disproportionate to the benefit of the remedial works. In Ruxley v Forsyth, loss of amenity damages were awarded because rebuilding the entire swimming pool to gain a few inches in depth was disproportionate. In this case, replacing the tiles is likely to be a reasonable and proportionate remedy to achieve the intended design. Therefore, the court would prefer to award the cost of cure rather than loss of amenity damages. E. This is wrong. Mental distress damages are generally not recoverable in breach of contract cases unless the contract's purpose was to provide pleasure, relaxation, or freedom from distress (as in Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233). The primary purpose of the contract for supplying wall tiles is commercial—to furnish the restaurant—not to provide personal enjoyment or alleviate distress. Therefore, damages for mental distress are unlikely to be awarded in this context.

The answer is C. The court is most likely to award damages based on the cost of cure, enabling the restaurant owner to recover the reasonable costs of replacing the incorrect tiles with the correct ones featuring the Greek flag. This measure aligns with the owner's intention to have a specific aesthetic for the restaurant and is appropriate when the cost of remedying the breach is proportionate to the benefit obtained.

The correct answer is C. Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. The court cannot order a new party to be substituted because the relevant limitation period was current when the claimant applied for the substitution. In this case, the limitation period expired in June 2023, which is six years after the alleged breach of contract in June 2017, as per the Limitation Act 1980 for contract claims. The claimant applied for substitution in October 2023, after the limitation period had expired. Therefore, the fact that the limitation period was not current when the application was made does not support the court's power to substitute a new party on this basis. B. This is wrong. While it is true that the limitation period has expired, the court can order a new party to be substituted because the relevant limitation period was current when the proceedings were started. The expiration of the limitation period after the commencement of proceedings does not prevent the court from ordering a substitution necessary for the continuation of the claim. C. This is correct. Under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 19.5(2), the court may order the substitution of a party if: (a) the relevant limitation period was current when the proceedings were started, and
(b) the addition or substitution is necessary. In this case: (1) The claimant brought the claim in March 2023, before the limitation period expired in June 2023. Therefore, the limitation period was current when the proceedings were started.

(2) The plumber died in August 2023, and the claimant applied to substitute the plumber's personal representatives in October 2023.

(3) Substituting the personal representatives is necessary to continue the claim against the deceased's estate, as the original defendant can no longer participate due to death. Therefore, the court has the power to order the substitution because the limitation period was current at the commencement of proceedings. D. This is wrong. The fact that the limitation period was current when the plumber died does not provide the basis for the court's power to substitute a new party. The critical factor is whether the limitation period was current when the proceedings were started, not when the defendant died. The substitution is governed by CPR 19.5, which focuses on the timing of the commencement of proceedings relative to the limitation period. E. This is wrong. The assertion that the court cannot order a new party to be substituted because liability remains with the plumber's business is incorrect. The plumber operated as a sole trader, meaning there is no legal distinction between the individual and the business. Upon the plumber's death, any legal claims against her must be pursued against her estate, represented by her personal representatives. Substitution of the personal representatives is necessary to continue the claim. The court can order this substitution under CPR 19.8(1), which allows the proceedings to continue against the deceased's estate. The answer is C. The court can order a new party to be substituted because the relevant limitation period was current when the proceedings were started. Since the claim was initiated before the limitation period expired, and substitution is necessary due to the defendant's death, the court has the power to substitute the personal representatives for the deceased plumber, allowing the claim to continue against the estate.

The correct answer is B. Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. Executed consideration refers to consideration that has already been performed at the time the contract is formed. In this scenario, the woman has not yet paid the £25; she has merely promised to pay it. Therefore, the consideration is executory, not executed. Since no payment has been made yet, there is no executed consideration, making option A incorrect.

B. This is correct. For a valid contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, consideration, and an intention to create legal relations. Consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate. This means that the law does not require the consideration to be equal in value to what is being exchanged; it just needs to be something of value in the eyes of the law.

In this case, the woman's promise to pay £25 is sufficient consideration. Even though £25 is much less than the bicycle's actual value of £390, the law does not require the consideration to be adequate. The man's mistake about the bicycle's value does not affect the validity of the contract unless there is some misrepresentation or undue influence, which is not indicated here. Therefore, a valid contract exists because sufficient consideration has been promised.

C. This is wrong. The assertion that there is no contract because the consideration is insufficient is incorrect. The £25 promised by the woman is sufficient consideration, even if it is not equal to the bicycle's market value. The law requires consideration to be sufficient (having some value) but not necessarily adequate (equal in value). Therefore, the consideration is sufficient to form a valid contract, making option C incorrect. D. This is wrong. This option claims that there is no contract because adequate consideration has not been promised. However, adequacy of consideration is not a requirement for a valid contract. The courts are not concerned with whether the consideration is adequate; they only require that something of value has been exchanged. Since £25 is something of value, the consideration is sufficient, and the lack of adequacy does not invalidate the contract. Therefore, option D is incorrect. E. This is wrong. The fact that the consideration is executory (a promise to do something in the future) does not prevent a contract from being formed. Executory consideration is a valid form of consideration in contract law. A contract can be based on promises to perform future acts. Since the woman has promised to pay £25, which the man has accepted, there is valid executory consideration, and thus a valid contract exists. Therefore, option E is incorrect. The answer is B. There is a contract because sufficient consideration has been promised. The woman's promise to pay £25 constitutes sufficient consideration, even though it is less than the bicycle's actual value. The man's unilateral mistake about the bicycle's value does not invalidate the contract. Therefore, the woman should be advised that she has a valid contract and can enforce the agreement to purchase the bicycle for £25.

The correct answer is B. Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. Private nuisance involves an unlawful interference with a person's use or enjoyment of land or some right over it. To bring a claim in private nuisance, the claimant must have a proprietary interest in the land affected, such as ownership or tenancy. In this case, the woman suffers economic loss because she cannot deliver her goods due to the roads being blocked by parked cars from the farmers market. However, there is no direct interference with her use or enjoyment of her own land. Therefore, private nuisance is not the appropriate cause of action. B. This is correct. Public nuisance is both a tort and a crime that involves an act or omission which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of a class of the public. To succeed in a civil claim for public nuisance, the claimant must demonstrate that: (1) A public nuisance exists: The man's operation of the farmers market causes the village to become very busy every Thursday, with roads blocked by parked cars. This obstructs the public's right to pass and repass on the highways, affecting the community at large. (2) She has suffered special damage: The woman experiences a loss beyond that suffered by the general public because her business is directly impacted—she is unable to deliver her goods and loses trade as a result. Therefore, she should pursue a claim in public nuisance, as she meets the criteria for this cause of action. C. This is wrong. The rule in Rylands v Fletcher imposes liability for damage caused by the escape of a dangerous thing brought onto land in the course of a non-natural use. The essential elements include the accumulation of something likely to cause mischief if it escapes, which then escapes and causes foreseeable damage. In this scenario, there is no accumulation or escape of a dangerous substance from the man's property. The issue is road congestion caused by visitors to the farmers market, not the escape of something hazardous. Therefore, Rylands v Fletcher does not apply. D. This is wrong. Negligence requires the claimant to prove that the defendant owed her a duty of care, breached that duty, and caused damage as a result. Establishing that the man owes a duty of care to the woman regarding road congestion caused by third parties (the visitors) is challenging. Additionally, the loss suffered is pure economic loss due to loss of trade, which is generally not recoverable in negligence unless there is a special relationship involving an assumption of responsibility, which does not exist here. Therefore, negligence is not the appropriate cause of action. E. This is wrong. Occupiers' liability pertains to the duty owed by occupiers of premises to those who enter their land, relating to injuries or damages suffered due to the state of the premises. The woman is not a visitor to the man's property, and her losses are not due to any defect or danger on his land. Therefore, occupiers' liability is not relevant in this context. The answer is B. The woman should pursue a claim in public nuisance because the man's operation of the farmers market causes widespread obstruction of public roads, interfering with the public's rights. She suffers special damage beyond that of the general public, as her business is directly harmed by the inability to deliver goods and the resultant loss of trade.

The correct answer is D. Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. In a partnership, capital gains are allocated among the partners according to their entitlement to capital profits, not income profits. While the partners share income profits equally, their shares of capital profits are different: senior partner 50%, managing partner 30%, and junior partner 20%. Therefore, each partner is not liable for Capital Gains Tax on one third of the gain. Allocating the gain equally among the partners does not reflect their agreed-upon shares of capital profits, making this option incorrect. B. This is wrong. An ordinary trading partnership is not a separate legal entity for tax purposes and thus is not liable to pay Corporation Tax. Instead, the partnership is tax-transparent, and the individual partners are liable to pay tax on their share of the partnership's income and gains. Therefore, the firm itself cannot be liable for Corporation Tax on the gain, and the partners cannot avoid liability. This makes option B incorrect. C. This is wrong. The gain realised from the sale of a capital asset like office premises is subject to Capital Gains Tax (CGT), not Income Tax. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the allocation should be based on their shares of capital profits, not income profits. Therefore, each partner would not be liable to pay Income Tax on one third of the gain. This option is incorrect both in the type of tax (Income Tax instead of CGT) and the allocation of the gain. D. This is correct. The partners will be liable to pay Capital Gains Tax on their respective shares of the gain, allocated according to their entitlement to capital profits. The senior partner is entitled to 50% of the capital profits, the managing partner to 30%, and the junior partner to 20%. Therefore: (1) The senior partner is liable for CGT on 50% of the gain.
(2) The managing partner is liable for CGT on 30% of the gain.
(3) The junior partner is liable for CGT on 20% of the gain. This allocation reflects both the correct type of tax and the partners' agreed shares of capital profits, making option D the correct answer. E. This is wrong. While the allocation of the gain aligns with the partners' shares of capital profits (50%, 30%, and 20%), the tax applied is incorrect. The gain from the sale of a capital asset is subject to Capital Gains Tax, not Income Tax. Therefore, the partners would not be liable to pay Income Tax on their shares of the gain. This makes option E incorrect due to the wrong type of tax being applied. The answer is D. Each partner is liable to pay Capital Gains Tax on their respective share of the gain from the sale of the office premises, allocated according to their entitlement to capital profits: senior partner 50%, managing partner 30%, and junior partner 20%.

The correct answer is B.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the freeholder can recover the outstanding rent from the chemist, the clothing retailer, and the newsagent. Under the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”), tenants of commercial leases granted on or after 1 January 1996 (known as “new leases”) are automatically released from lease covenants upon assignment unless they have entered into an Authorised Guarantee Agreement (AGA).

In this scenario the newsagent assigned the lease to the clothing retailer and provided an AGA. The clothing retailer assigned the lease to the chemist. There is no mention of an AGA from the clothing retailer. The chemist assigned the lease to the bookstore and provided an AGA.An AGA binds the assigning tenant (assignor) to guarantee the immediate assignee’s obligations under the lease, but it does not extend beyond that assignee.

Therefore, the newsagent’s AGA only guarantees the clothing retailer’s obligations. The clothing retailer, having assigned the lease without providing an AGA, is released from liability under the 1995 Act. The chemist’s AGA guarantees the bookstore’s obligations.

Since the bookstore has defaulted, the landlord can only pursue the chemist under the AGA. The newsagent and the clothing retailer are not liable for the bookstore’s failure to pay rent. Therefore, Option A is incorrect.

B. This is correct.

The landlord can recover the outstanding rent from the chemist only.

When the chemist assigned the lease to the bookstore, they provided an Authorised Guarantee Agreement (AGA) to the landlord. Under the AGA, the chemist guarantees the bookstore’s performance of the lease covenants, including the payment of rent. Therefore, if the bookstore defaults, the landlord can enforce the AGA against the chemist to recover the outstanding rent.

The chemist is liable under the AGA they provided. The clothing retailer is not liable because they did not provide an AGA and are automatically released from the lease covenants upon assignment under the 1995 Act. The newsagent’s AGA only guaranteed the clothing retailer’s obligations and does not extend to subsequent assignees like the chemist or the bookstore.Thus, the landlord can recover the outstanding rent from the chemist only. Option B is correct.

C. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the landlord can recover the outstanding rent from the clothing retailer only.

Under the 1995 Act, when the clothing retailer assigned the lease to the chemist, they were automatically released from the lease covenants because there is no mention of an AGA being provided. Without an AGA, the clothing retailer has no continuing liability for the lease obligations after assignment. Therefore, the landlord cannot pursue the clothing retailer for the bookstore’s default. Option C is incorrect.

D. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the landlord can recover the outstanding rent from the newsagent only.

The newsagent assigned the lease to the clothing retailer and provided an AGA, thereby guaranteeing the clothing retailer’s obligations under the lease. However, once the clothing retailer assigned the lease to the chemist, the newsagent’s liability under the AGA ceased because the AGA only covers the immediate assignee’s obligations during their tenure.

Since the defaulting tenant is the bookstore, and the newsagent’s AGA does not extend to subsequent assignees beyond the clothing retailer, the landlord cannot recover the outstanding rent from the newsagent. Option D is incorrect.

E. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the landlord can recover the outstanding rent from both the chemist and the newsagent.

As previously explained:

The chemist is liable under the AGA they provided when assigning the lease to the bookstore.The newsagent is not liable because their AGA only guaranteed the clothing retailer’s obligations, which ended when the clothing retailer assigned the lease to the chemist.Therefore, while the landlord can recover the outstanding rent from the chemist, they cannot recover it from the newsagent. Option E is incorrect.

The answer is B. The landlord can recover the outstanding rent from the chemist only.

The correct answer is D. Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. The Court of Appeal does have the power to grant permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. However, it is not the only court with this power. Under the Civil Procedure Rules and the Supreme Court Rules 2009, if the Court of Appeal refuses permission, the defendant can apply directly to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal. Therefore, stating that only the Court of Appeal has this power is incorrect. B. This is wrong. The Supreme Court can grant permission to appeal, but it is not the only court that can do so. A party wishing to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal must first seek permission from the Court of Appeal itself. If the Court of Appeal refuses, the party can then apply to the Supreme Court. Thus, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have the power to grant permission to appeal. C. This is wrong. The House of Lords no longer serves as the highest appellate court in the UK. Since the establishment of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in 2009 under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the judicial functions of the House of Lords have been transferred to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the House of Lords does not have the power to grant permission to appeal. D. This is correct. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have the power to grant permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. Under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR 52.3) and the Supreme Court Rules 2009, the process is as follows: (1) First Application: The defendant must first apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. (2) If Refused: If the Court of Appeal refuses permission, the defendant can then apply directly to the Supreme Court for permission under Section 40 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.

Therefore, both courts have the authority to grant permission, making option D the correct answer. E. This is wrong. As mentioned earlier, the House of Lords no longer holds judicial powers since the establishment of the Supreme Court in 2009. Therefore, it does not have the power to grant permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal does have this power, but combining it with the House of Lords is incorrect. The answer is D. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have the power to grant permission to appeal a decision made by the Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The defendant must first seek permission from the Court of Appeal; if refused, they can then apply directly to the Supreme Court. This two-tiered approach ensures that both courts have a role in the permission process.

The correct answer is D.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong.

This option states that the court can only order the grant of a new tenancy on the same terms as the existing tenancy. Under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, specifically Section 35, the court has the power to determine the terms of the new tenancy as it considers reasonable, subject to certain statutory guidelines. The court is not restricted to granting a new tenancy on the same terms as the existing one; it can modify or impose new terms to reflect current circumstances and ensure fairness to both parties.

Therefore, Option A is incorrect because it inaccurately limits the court’s powers to replicating the existing tenancy terms without any alterations.

B. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the court can only order the grant of a new tenancy on the same terms as the existing tenancy except with regard to rent. While it’s true that rent is a key term often adjusted in new tenancies, the court’s powers are not limited to modifying rent alone. Under Section 35 of the 1954 Act, the court can consider and alter various terms of the tenancy, including repairing obligations, alienation provisions, and other covenants, to ensure the terms are reasonable in the current context.Therefore, Option B is incorrect because it wrongly confines the court’s ability to adjust only the rent, disregarding its broader authority to modify other terms.

C. This is wrong.

This option asserts that the court can only order the grant of a new tenancy on the same terms as the existing tenancy for a term not exceeding 15 years. While Section 33 of the 1954 Act does stipulate that the court cannot order a new tenancy with a term exceeding 15 years, the court is not confined to the same terms as the existing tenancy. The court has discretion under Section 35 to determine the terms that are fair and reasonable, which may differ from the existing tenancy terms.

Therefore, Option C is incorrect because, although it correctly mentions the maximum term of 15 years, it incorrectly limits the court to granting a tenancy on the same terms as the existing one.

D. This is correct.

Under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, when the landlord and tenant cannot agree on the terms of a new business tenancy following a tenant’s request under Section 26, the court has the authority to determine the terms of the new tenancy. Specifically:

Section 35 grants the court power to order the grant of a new tenancy on such terms as it determines, subject to certain statutory considerations. The court will consider the circumstances of the case and aim to strike a fair balance between the interests of the landlord and the tenant.

Section 33 limits the duration of the new tenancy to a term not exceeding 15 years. The court will decide the length of the term based on what is reasonable in the circumstances.

Therefore, Option D accurately reflects the extent of the court’s powers: the court can order the grant of a new tenancy on such terms as it determines under the 1954 Act, for a term not exceeding 15 years.

E. This is wrong.

This option claims that the court can only order the grant of a new tenancy on the same terms as the existing tenancy and contracted out of the 1954 Act. This is incorrect for several reasons:

Contracting out of the 1954 Act (i.e., excluding the tenant’s right to renew the tenancy) requires a specific procedure to be followed before the grant of the lease, involving the service of a warning notice by the landlord and a declaration or statutory declaration by the tenant, as per Sections 38A and the Regulatory Reform (Business Tenancies) (England and Wales) Order 2003.

The court cannot retrospectively contract a tenancy out of the Act’s protections. Its powers are to grant a new tenancy within the framework of the Act, not to exclude its application.Additionally, the court is not confined to granting a new tenancy on the same terms as the existing one, as previously explained.

Therefore, Option E is incorrect because it misunderstands the court’s powers and the legal requirements for contracting out of the 1954 Act.

The answer is D. The court can only order the grant of a new tenancy on such terms as it determines under the 1954 Act for a term not exceeding 15 years. This reflects the correct legal position under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, where the court has the discretion to set the terms and duration of a new business tenancy when the landlord and tenant cannot reach an agreement, ensuring that the terms are fair and reasonable for both parties.

The correct answer is D.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that registration at the Land Registry must take place within 30 working days of the date contracts are exchanged to avoid interest becoming payable on outstanding SDLT (Stamp Duty Land Tax). This is incorrect because the deadline for paying SDLT to HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) is 14 calendar days from the “effective date” of the transaction, which is usually the date of completion, not the date of exchange of contracts. Additionally, the time limit for registration at the Land Registry is not directly related to the payment of SDLT or the accrual of interest on unpaid SDLT. Failing to register within 30 working days of exchange does not result in interest on outstanding SDLT, making Option A incorrect.

B. This is wrong. This option suggests that registration must take place within 30 working days of the date of completion to avoid interest becoming payable on outstanding completion monies. This is incorrect because completion monies (the purchase price and any associated costs) are settled on the date of completion. Interest on completion monies would only become an issue if there was a delay in transferring funds on the completion date, not due to a delay in registration at the Land Registry. The requirement to register at the Land Registry is to secure legal title and priority, not to avoid interest on completion monies. Therefore, Option B is incorrect.

C. This is wrong. This option claims that registration must occur within 30 working days of completion to avoid the equitable title in the property reverting to the seller. This is incorrect because, upon completion, the equitable title passes to the purchaser, while the legal title passes upon registration. The equitable title does not revert to the seller if there is a delay in registration. However, there is a risk that the purchaser may lose priority if they fail to register within the priority period, but this does not result in the equitable title reverting to the seller. Therefore, Option C is incorrect.

D. This is correct. Registration at the Land Registry must take place within 30 working days of the date of the result of the priority search, to avoid subsequent entries being made on the title which bind the purchaser. The priority search (known as an official search with priority) secures a 30 working day priority period during which any applications submitted by third parties will be postponed behind the purchaser’s application, provided the purchaser’s application is lodged within that period. This is established under Rule 131 of the Land Registration Rules 2003. By registering within this priority period, the purchaser ensures that their interest is protected and that no adverse entries (such as new charges, notices, or restrictions) can take priority over their application. Therefore, Option D accurately reflects the legal requirement to register within the priority period to secure the purchaser’s title and is correct.

E. This is wrong. This option suggests that registration must take place within 30 working days of completion to avoid the mortgagee’s (lender’s) power of sale arising under the legal charge. This is incorrect because the mortgagee’s power of sale arises when the borrower defaults on the mortgage terms, typically by failing to make repayments, not simply due to a delay in registration. While it is important to register the legal charge promptly to perfect the lender’s security interest and establish priority, a delay in registration alone does not trigger the mortgagee’s power of sale under the Law of Property Act 1925. Therefore, Option E is incorrect.

The answer is D. Registration at the Land Registry must take place within 30 working days of the date of the result of the priority search, to avoid subsequent entries being made on the title which bind the purchaser. By ensuring that the application for registration is lodged within the priority period granted by the priority search, the purchaser secures their legal title and protects their interest against any intervening registrations that could adversely affect their ownership of the property.

The correct answer is A.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is correct. The mother has a vested interest, and the nephew and niece have contingent interests. In the will trust provision, the mother is to live in the property for the remainder of her life. Her interest is immediate and not subject to any conditions precedent, meaning it is a life interest vested in possession. She has an unequivocal right to occupy and use the property from the moment of the testator’s death.

The nephew and niece are to receive the property after the mother’s death, but their interests are contingent upon two conditions: they must survive the mother and attain the age of 21 years. These are conditions precedent that must be satisfied before their interests vest. The niece, being 22 years old, has met the age requirement but must still survive the mother. The nephew, aged 20, must both reach the age of 21 and survive the mother. Since it is uncertain whether these conditions will be met, their interests are contingent until the conditions are fulfilled.

B. This is wrong. This option suggests that the mother has a contingent interest while the nephew and niece have vested interests. This is incorrect because the mother’s interest is vested and not contingent upon any future event. She has an immediate right to enjoy the property for her lifetime. The nephew and niece do not have vested interests because their entitlement depends on surviving the mother (both) and attaining the age of 21 (nephew). Their interests are thus contingent, not vested.

C. This is wrong. This option claims that the mother, nephew, and niece all have contingent interests. This is incorrect regarding the mother. The mother’s life interest is vested because it takes effect immediately upon the testator’s death and is not subject to any conditions. Only the nephew and niece have contingent interests due to the conditions attached to their future entitlement.

D. This is wrong. This option asserts that the mother, nephew, and niece all have vested interests. While it is true that the mother has a vested interest, the nephew and niece’s interests are contingent upon surviving the mother and, in the nephew’s case, reaching the age of 21. Their interests are not vested because these conditions precedent have not yet been satisfied.

E. This is wrong. This option states that the mother and niece have vested interests but the nephew has a contingent interest. Although the niece is already 22 years old and has satisfied the age condition, she must still survive the mother for her interest to vest. Since the mother is still alive, the niece’s interest remains contingent upon that condition. Therefore, both the nephew and the niece have contingent interests, not vested interests.

Therefore, the correct answer is A: The mother has a vested interest but the nephew and niece have contingent interests.

The correct answer is E.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong.

This option states that the gift is not valid because the class of beneficiaries is administratively unworkable. Administrative unworkability is a concept that can arise in trusts with a very large or uncertain class of beneficiaries, making it impractical to carry out the trust. However, in the context of fixed trusts, the crucial requirement is the certainty of objects, which means that it must be possible to compile a complete list of all beneficiaries at the time the trust comes into effect.

In this scenario, the trust is a fixed trust (as opposed to a discretionary trust) because the property is to be divided equally among all the present and former employees of the company after the daughter’s death. The daughter has a complete list of all past and present employees, satisfying the list certainty test established in IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch 20. Therefore, the trust is not administratively unworkable, and Option A is incorrect.

B. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the gift is not valid because a company cannot be a beneficiary. However, the gift is not to the company itself but to the present and former employees of the company. Individual employees are natural persons who can undoubtedly be beneficiaries under a trust. There is no legal impediment to employees being beneficiaries simply because of their association with the company. Therefore, Option B is incorrect because it misstates the nature of the beneficiaries and the legal principles involved.

C. This is wrong.

This option claims that the gift is valid because the company still exists. While the existence of the company may facilitate identifying and locating the beneficiaries, the validity of the trust does not depend on the company’s continued existence. The key issue is the certainty of objects—whether the beneficiaries can be clearly identified. Since the daughter has a complete list of past and present employees, the beneficiaries are certain regardless of the company’s current status. Therefore, Option C is incorrect because it does not accurately explain why the gift is valid.

D. This is wrong.

This option states that the gift is valid because there are a large number of employees who can benefit from it. However, the mere fact that many employees can benefit does not, in itself, determine the trust’s validity. In fact, a very large class of beneficiaries can sometimes render a trust administratively unworkable if it makes the trust impractical to administer. Nevertheless, in this case, the trust is valid because the beneficiaries are certain and identifiable, not merely because there are many of them. Therefore, Option D is incorrect because it does not correctly identify the legal basis for the trust’s validity.

E. This is correct.

The gift is valid because there is a complete record of past and present employees of the company. For a fixed trust, the requirement is that the beneficiaries must be certain; that is, it must be possible to draw up a complete list of all the beneficiaries at the time the trust comes into effect. This principle was established in IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch 20, where the court held that for a fixed trust, the objects must be known to a complete certainty.

In this scenario, although the daughter is not sure that all the beneficiaries can be traced, she possesses a complete list of all past and present employees. The inability to locate or contact some beneficiaries does not invalidate the trust as long as the beneficiaries can be identified. The trustees can retain the shares of any unlocated beneficiaries until they come forward or follow procedures under trust law for missing beneficiaries.

Therefore, since the beneficiaries are certain and can be comprehensively listed, the trust satisfies the certainty of objects requirement, and the gift is valid. Option E correctly identifies the legal basis for the trust’s validity.

The answer is E. The gift is valid because there is a complete record of past and present employees of the company. This ensures the certainty of objects required for a valid fixed trust, allowing the trustees to identify all beneficiaries and administer the trust according to the testator’s intentions.