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The correct answer is C

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. The fact that no trading or capital losses were incurred in the first accounting period does not, by itself, enable the company to set off the trading loss from the second accounting period against the chargeable gain from the first period. The key consideration is whether the tax legislation permits such a set-off, not the absence of prior losses. Therefore, option A is incorrect because it does not provide the correct legal basis for the set-off.

B. This is wrong. Under the Corporation Tax Act 2010, specifically Section 37, a company can carry back a trading loss to the preceding 12 months and set it off against its total profits, which include both trading profits and chargeable gains. The assertion that a trading loss can only be set off against trading profits from an earlier accounting period is incorrect. The law allows for trading losses to be offset against total profits, including chargeable gains, of the preceding year. Therefore, option B is incorrect.

C. This is correct. According to Section 37 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010, a company that incurs a trading loss in an accounting period can carry back that loss and set it off against its total profits (including chargeable gains) of the preceding 12 months, provided that the company was carrying on the same trade during that period. In this case, the company's trading loss of £45,000 from the second accounting period (ending 31 December of the following year) can be carried back and set off against the chargeable gain of £75,000 made in November of the first accounting period. The chargeable gain occurred within the 12-month period immediately before the accounting period in which the trading loss was incurred. Therefore, the company can utilise the trading loss to reduce the taxable gain from the previous period, making option C correct.

D. This is wrong. The company's ability to carry back a trading loss is not negated by the fact that it was not carrying on business for a full 12-month period before the loss-making accounting period. The key requirement is that the company was carrying on the same trade in the accounting period in which the loss is made and the preceding period. Since the company commenced trading in April and continued trading into the second accounting period, it satisfies this condition. Therefore, option D is incorrect.

E. This is wrong. While it is true that trading losses can be carried forward to set off against future trading profits, the assertion that they can only be carried forward is incorrect. The Corporation Tax Act 2010 allows companies to carry back trading losses to the preceding 12 months and set them off against total profits, including chargeable gains. Therefore, the company is not limited to carrying the loss forward and can choose to carry it back to offset the chargeable gain from the previous period. Option E is therefore incorrect.

The answer is C. The trading loss of £45,000 made in the second accounting period can be set off against the chargeable gain of £75,000 from the first accounting period because the chargeable gain occurred within the 12-month period immediately before the accounting period in which the trading loss was incurred. This is permitted under Section 37 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010, which allows a company to carry back a trading loss to the preceding year and set it off against total profits, including chargeable gains.

The correct answer is D

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. While the board minutes document the directors' proposal to amend the articles, they are not required to be filed with the Registrar of Companies. The Companies Act 2006 does not mandate the filing of board minutes. Although the shareholders' resolution to adopt the new articles must be filed, including the board minutes is unnecessary and incorrect.

B. This is wrong. The shareholders' resolution to adopt the new articles does need to be filed with the Registrar. However, there is no prescribed fee for filing the resolution or the new articles with Companies House. The inclusion of a prescribed fee in this context is incorrect, making this option wrong.

C. This is wrong. Filing the new articles with the Registrar of Companies is required under Section 26 of the Companies Act 2006. However, similar to option B, there is no prescribed fee for this filing. Additionally, this option omits the necessity to file the shareholders' resolution, which is required under Section 29 of the Act. Therefore, this option is incomplete and incorrect.

D. This is correct. After adopting the new articles of association, the company must file both the shareholders' special resolution adopting the new articles and the new articles themselves with the Registrar of Companies. This requirement is stipulated under Sections 26 and 29 of the Companies Act 2006. Filing both documents ensures that the company's constitutional documents are up to date and available on the public record.

E. This is wrong. While the new articles must be filed with the Registrar, the board minutes proposing the changes are not required to be filed. The Companies Act 2006 does not mandate the filing of board minutes with Companies House. The omission of the shareholders' resolution in this option also makes it incorrect.The answer is D. Following the adoption of the new articles of association, the company must file both the shareholders' resolution adopting the new articles and the new articles themselves with the Registrar of Companies. This ensures compliance with the Companies Act 2006 and keeps the public record accurate.

The correct answer is DLet us go through these and explain.A. This is wrong. The literal rule is a method of statutory interpretation where judges interpret the words of a statute in their plain, ordinary, or literal sense, even if the outcome is absurd or unjust. In this scenario, the judge initially considers the ordinary meaning of the words but finds that it leads to an absurd result. Instead of applying the literal meaning regardless of the outcome, the judge chooses a different interpretation to avoid absurdity. Therefore, the literal rule was not used.B. This is wrong. The mischief rule allows judges to interpret a statute by looking at the law before the statute was passed to determine the “mischief” or problem the statute was intended to remedy. The judge focuses on the statute's purpose and interprets it in a way that suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. In this case, there is no indication that the judge examined the prior law or the statute's purpose to identify a specific mischief. Therefore, the mischief rule was not applied.C. This is wrong. The extrinsic evidence rule involves using materials outside the statute itself—such as legislative history, parliamentary debates (Hansard), or other external documents—to aid in interpretation. There is no mention of the judge consulting external sources or extrinsic materials to interpret the statute. Thus, the extrinsic evidence rule was not employed.D. This is correct. The golden rule is a modification of the literal rule. It allows judges to depart from the ordinary meaning of a word if applying the literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity or an outcome that is inconsistent with the intentions of Parliament. In this scenario, the judge first looks at the natural ordinary meaning of the words but finds that such an interpretation results in an absurd meaning. To avoid this, the judge interprets the words differently to prevent the absurd outcome. This is a classic application of the golden rule.

E. This is wrong. The intrinsic evidence rule involves interpreting a statute using internal aids found within the statute itself, such as definitions, long titles, preambles, schedules, or other provisions of the statute. While judges often use intrinsic aids to interpret statutes, there is no indication in this scenario that the judge relied on other parts of the statute to interpret the problematic section. Therefore, the intrinsic evidence rule was not specifically utilised.

The answer is D. The judge used the golden rule to interpret the statute by departing from the literal meaning of the words to avoid an absurd result, thereby ensuring that the interpretation aligns with the statute's intended purpose.

The correct answer is BLet us go through these and explain.A. This is wrong. When there is overlap between a prerogative power and a statute, it is not the case that neither prevails and that the courts look to the common law for guidance. In UK constitutional law, statutes enacted by Parliament take precedence over prerogative powers. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty dictates that statutory law overrides any conflicting prerogative powers. Therefore, the assertion that neither prevails and that courts must look to the common law is incorrect.B. This is correct. Where there is overlap or conflict between a prerogative power and a statute, the statute prevails. This is a fundamental principle of UK constitutional law, affirming the supremacy of Parliament. In the case of Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508, the House of Lords held that when a statute covers the same subject matter as a prerogative power, the government must rely on the statute rather than the prerogative. In this scenario, Parliament has passed legislation creating a compensation scheme for those affected by the government's control over their buildings. Therefore, the government should use the statutory powers, including the compensation scheme, rather than relying on prerogative powers to avoid paying compensation.C. This is wrong. The prerogative power does not prevail over a statute when there is an overlap. Parliamentary sovereignty means that statutes have higher authority than prerogative powers. The government cannot use prerogative powers to circumvent or ignore legislation passed by Parliament. Therefore, the assertion that the prerogative power prevails is incorrect.

D. This is wrong. While judges may sometimes refer to parliamentary proceedings (e.g., Hansard) for guidance in interpreting ambiguous legislation, known as the Pepper v Hart principle, this is not applicable in determining whether a statute prevails over a prerogative power. The legal principle that statutes override prerogative powers is well-established. Therefore, the judge does not need to refer to proceedings in Parliament for guidance on this matter.E. This is wrong. A judge hearing the matter does not need to refer to a higher court for guidance on whether a statute prevails over a prerogative power. This principle is settled law in the UK legal system. The judge can apply the established doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty without seeking guidance from a higher court. Therefore, the assertion that the judge may refer to a higher court for guidance is incorrect.The answer is B. Where there is overlap between a prerogative power and a statute, the statute prevails. This upholds the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, ensuring that the government cannot use prerogative powers to bypass or undermine legislation enacted by Parliament.

The correct answer is ELet us go through these and explain.A. This is wrong. The solicitor cannot rely on the fact that the initial cost was only an estimate to avoid informing the client of significant changes. Under the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) Code of Conduct, solicitors have a duty to keep their clients updated about any changes to costs information given at the outset. Since the additional £3,000 for expert evidence significantly increases the total estimated costs, the solicitor must inform the client promptly. Failing to do so would breach the obligation to provide the best possible information about costs throughout the matter.

B. This is wrong. While experts' costs can sometimes be recovered from the other party if the case is successful, the client is initially responsible for these costs. The solicitor cannot assume that the court will award these costs or that the client does not need to be informed about them. The SRA Code of Conduct requires solicitors to inform clients about all likely payments, including disbursements such as experts' fees. Therefore, the solicitor must inform the client about the additional cost and cannot omit this responsibility on the basis that experts' costs are awarded by the court.C. This is wrong. Solicitors are obliged to inform their clients about all costs associated with their case, including third-party costs like counsel's fees and expert fees. The SRA Code of Conduct mandates that solicitors provide clients with the best possible information about the overall cost of their matter, including any disbursements. Claiming that there is no obligation to tell the client about third-party costs is incorrect and would constitute a breach of professional duties.

D. This is wrong. While it is important for the solicitor to inform the client about the additional cost and seek instructions, the assertion that a solicitor must get prior approval for every item of expenditure is inaccurate. The SRA Code of Conduct does not require solicitors to obtain prior approval for every expense. Instead, the solicitor must ensure that the client is informed about any significant changes in costs and should seek instructions if those changes affect how the client wishes to proceed. Therefore, the reasoning provided in this option is incorrect.

E. This is correct. The solicitor should write to the client to inform him about the cost of the expert and ask for his instructions because the original estimate is no longer accurate. According to the SRA Code of Conduct, solicitors must keep their clients updated about any significant changes to costs information provided at the outset. The additional £3,000 for expert evidence represents a substantial increase in the estimated total costs. By informing the client and seeking instructions, the solicitor ensures that the client can make an informed decision about whether to proceed with incurring the additional expense.

The answer is E. The solicitor is required to inform the client about the additional £3,000 cost for expert evidence because this changes the original estimate of £15,000. This obligation arises from the need to keep the client properly informed so they can make informed decisions about their case, in compliance with the SRA Code of Conduct.

The correct answer is ALet us go through these and explain.A. This is correct. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998, mandates that member states must secure the Convention rights for everyone within their jurisdiction, regardless of nationality. Article 3 of the ECHR explicitly prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This prohibition is absolute and non-derogable, meaning it cannot be suspended under any circumstances, including cases involving serious crimes or threats to national security.In this scenario, deporting the man to his country of origin, where evidence obtained through torture would be used against him, would expose him to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment and a flagrant denial of justice. This would constitute a violation of his rights under Article 3 and potentially Article 6 (the right to a fair trial). The UK courts have a duty to prevent such violations by refusing to uphold deportation orders in these circumstances. Therefore, the High Court would not uphold the deportation order because the Convention requires the UK to protect the human rights of everyone within its jurisdiction.B. This is wrong. While the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) oversees compliance with the ECHR, it is not necessary for the merits of deportation decisions involving non-signatory countries to be considered exclusively by the ECtHR. Domestic courts, like the High Court in the UK, are fully empowered and obligated to interpret and apply the Convention rights in cases before them. The Human Rights Act 1998 requires UK courts to act in a manner compatible with the Convention rights. Therefore, the High Court can and should assess the human rights implications of the deportation order without referring the matter to the ECtHR. The assertion that only the ECtHR can consider such cases is incorrect.C. This is wrong. The UK government cannot absolve itself of responsibility by claiming it is not accountable for how another sovereign state obtains evidence. Under the ECHR, specifically Article 3, the UK has a positive obligation not to expose individuals to a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, which includes scenarios where evidence obtained by torture may be used against them in a trial. The case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom (2012) established that deporting someone to face a trial where there is a real risk of torture-tainted evidence being used violates Article 6 and potentially Article 3. Therefore, the High Court would recognise that deporting the man under these circumstances would breach the UK's obligations under the Convention. Thus, the court would not uphold the deportation order on this basis.

D. This is wrong. The Convention rights apply to “everyone within their jurisdiction,” which includes non-UK nationals residing in the UK. The protections afforded by the ECHR are not limited to UK citizens; they extend to all individuals regardless of nationality or immigration status. The Human Rights Act 1998 enforces these rights domestically. Therefore, the assertion that non-UK nationals do not benefit from UK human rights protection is incorrect. The High Court must consider the man's Convention rights before making a decision on the deportation order.

E. This is wrong. The ECHR protects the rights of all individuals, including those accused of serious crimes. The absolute prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 is not diminished by the nature of the alleged offense. The Convention is designed to uphold fundamental human rights universally, without exceptions based on the severity of alleged criminal conduct. Therefore, the High Court cannot justify upholding the deportation order on the grounds that the man has allegedly committed a serious crime. Such an action would violate the UK's obligations under the Convention.

The answer is A. The High Court would not uphold the deportation order because the European Convention on Human Rights requires member countries to secure the Convention rights for everyone within their jurisdiction. Deporting the man to a country where there is a real risk that evidence obtained through torture will be used against him would violate his rights under Article 3 of the Convention. Therefore, to comply with its legal obligations, the High Court would refuse to uphold the deportation order.

The correct answer is A.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is correct. The client will require planning permission for the change of use but not for the internal works. Under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”), a material change in the use of a building constitutes “development” as per Section 55(1). Changing the property’s use from office premises (commercial use) to a single private dwelling house (residential use) is a material change of use that requires planning permission.

However, the internal works do not require planning permission because they do not constitute “development” under Section 55(2)(a)(i) of the 1990 Act. This section states that works which affect only the interior of the building are not considered development, provided the building is not listed. Since the property is not a listed building, internal alterations can be carried out without planning permission.

Therefore, while the client can proceed with the internal works, she must obtain planning permission for the change of use from office to residential.

B. This is wrong. This option asserts that neither the internal works nor the change of use constitutes development because the previous use was abandoned over four years ago. This is incorrect because if the previous use has been abandoned, there is no existing lawful use of the property. Introducing a new use (residential) constitutes a material change of use from nil use, which requires planning permission under Section 55(1) of the 1990 Act. The abandonment of the previous use does not negate the requirement for planning permission; instead, it reinforces it.

C. This is wrong. This option claims that neither the internal works nor the change of use constitutes development because it is a change to a single private dwelling house. While internal works to a non-listed building do not constitute development (Section 55(2)(a)(i)), the change from office use to residential use is a material change of use under Section 55(1). The fact that the new use is as a single private dwelling house does not exempt it from requiring planning permission. Therefore, the client must obtain planning permission for the change of use.

D. This is wrong. This option states that the client will require planning permission for both the internal works and the change of use because they are developments which are not permitted. This is incorrect regarding the internal works. Under Section 55(2)(a)(i) of the 1990 Act, internal alterations to a non-listed building are not considered development and thus do not require planning permission. However, the change of use does require planning permission. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that planning permission is needed for both the internal works and the change of use.

E. This is wrong. This option suggests that neither the internal works nor the change of use requires planning permission because the change is not material. This is incorrect because the change from office premises to a single private dwelling house is considered a material change of use under Section 55(1) of the 1990 Act. A material change of use requires planning permission unless specific permitted development rights apply, which are not applicable in this scenario due to the property’s vacancy and potential abandonment. Therefore, the assertion that the change is not material is incorrect.

The answer is A. The client needs planning permission for the change of use from office premises to a single private dwelling house, but not for the internal works, as they do not constitute development under the 1990 Act.

The correct answer is D.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that the man is not in breach of his bail condition because contact was initiated by his girlfriend and that he will not face any consequences as a result of his visit to his girlfriend’s flat. This is incorrect because bail conditions are legally binding and must be strictly adhered to by the defendant, regardless of who initiates contact. The condition not to contact his girlfriend prohibits any form of contact, whether direct or indirect, and whether initiated by the defendant or the complainant. By responding to his girlfriend’s request and visiting her flat, the man has breached his bail condition. Therefore, he may face consequences for this breach. Option A is incorrect.

B. This is wrong. This option suggests that the man is not in breach of his bail condition because he had good reason to be in contact with his girlfriend, and that he will not face any consequences as a result of his visit. This is incorrect because bail conditions must be followed strictly, and personal reasons do not provide a legal justification for breaching them. Even if the child was ill and needed assistance, the man should have sought to have the bail condition varied by applying to the court or contacting his solicitor. By unilaterally deciding to breach the condition, he has failed to comply with his legal obligations. Therefore, Option B is incorrect.

C. This is wrong. This option states that the man is in breach of his bail condition and that he may be charged with an offence of breach of bail condition. In the context of England and Wales, breaching a bail condition is not a separate criminal offence (with certain exceptions such as failure to surrender to custody). Instead, under Section 7 of the Bail Act 1976, if a defendant breaches their bail conditions, they can be arrested without a warrant and brought before a court, which may reconsider their bail status. They are not charged with a separate offence for breaching the condition itself. Therefore, Option C is incorrect because it erroneously suggests that the man may be charged with a new offence solely for breaching his bail condition.

D. This is correct. The man is in breach of his bail condition and will be brought before the court for his bail to be reconsidered. Under Section 7 of the Bail Act 1976, if a person released on bail fails to comply with any of the conditions of bail, a constable may arrest them without a warrant. The individual must then be brought before a magistrates’ court as soon as possible. At the hearing, the court will reconsider whether to grant bail and on what conditions. The court may choose to:1. Remand the defendant in custody if they believe the defendant will not comply with bail conditions in the future. 2. Re-release the defendant on bail, potentially with more stringent conditions to mitigate the risk of further breaches.

Option D accurately reflects the legal position by stating that the man is in breach of his bail condition and that he will be brought before the court for his bail to be reconsidered. Therefore, Option D is correct.

E. This is wrong. This option claims that the man is in breach of his bail condition and that he will be remanded in custody until his case goes to trial. While it is possible that the court may decide to remand the defendant in custody after reconsidering his bail, this outcome is not automatic or guaranteed. The decision to remand in custody depends on various factors, including: 3. The seriousness of the breach. 4. The defendant’s past compliance with bail conditions. 5. The risk of further offences, failure to surrender, or interference with witnesses.

The court may opt to continue bail with the same or modified conditions if it believes that the defendant will comply in the future. Therefore, Option E is incorrect because it asserts definitively that the man will be remanded in custody until trial, without acknowledging the court’s discretion in the matter.

The answer is D. The man is in breach of his bail condition, and he will be brought before the court for his bail to be reconsidered.

The correct answer is C.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that the partner, the son, and the man’s daughter are entitled to share in the distribution of the man’s estate. Under the intestacy rules in England and Wales, when someone dies intestate (without a valid will) and has never been married or in a civil partnership, their estate is distributed to their relatives according to a strict legal order. Cohabiting partners are not recognised under the intestacy rules and have no automatic right to inherit. Therefore, the man’s partner is not entitled to any share of his estate. Including the partner as an heir is incorrect, making Option A wrong.

B. This is wrong. This option suggests that the son, the man’s daughter, and the partner’s daughter are entitled to inherit. While the son and the man’s daughter are entitled under the intestacy rules, the partner’s daughter is not. The partner’s daughter is not biologically related to the man, nor has she been legally adopted by him. Living together as a family does not confer legal inheritance rights under intestacy law. Therefore, the partner’s daughter has no entitlement to the man’s estate, making Option B incorrect.

C. This is correct. The son and the man’s daughter are entitled to share in the distribution of the man’s estate. Under the intestacy rules, if a person dies without a will and has no spouse or civil partner, their estate passes to their children in equal shares. This includes both biological and legally adopted children. In this case, the man had:1. A son (aged 25 years) from a previous relationship. 2. A daughter (aged 19 years) whom he and his partner adopted ten years ago.

Both the son and the adopted daughter are the man’s legal children and are entitled to inherit his estate equally. Therefore, Option C accurately reflects the legal position.

D. This is wrong. This option states that only the son is entitled to inherit. While the son is indeed entitled under the intestacy rules, excluding the man’s adopted daughter is incorrect. Adopted children are treated in law as the natural children of their adoptive parents according to the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Therefore, the adopted daughter has the same rights as a biological child and is equally entitled to inherit. Option D is incorrect because it fails to recognise the adopted daughter’s entitlement.

E. This is wrong. This option suggests that only the man’s daughter is entitled to inherit. Excluding the son is incorrect. Both the biological son and the adopted daughter are the man’s legal children under the intestacy rules. When there is no surviving spouse or civil partner, the estate is divided equally among all the deceased’s children. Therefore, Option E is incorrect because it overlooks the son’s entitlement.

Therefore, the correct answer is C. The son and the man’s daughter only are entitled to share in the distribution of the man’s estate under the intestacy rules, as they are his legal children and there is no surviving spouse or civil partner.

The correct answer is C.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that the breach of Code D of PACE may lead the court to conclude that the evidence should be excluded if its admission would be an abuse of process. While an abuse of process can lead to the exclusion of evidence, this concept usually applies when the prosecution’s conduct is so severe that it would be unfair to try the defendant at all. In this context, the issue is whether the admission of improperly obtained identification evidence would adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings, not whether it constitutes an abuse of process. Therefore, Option A is incorrect because it misapplies the concept of abuse of process to the exclusion of evidence resulting from a breach of Code D.

B. This is wrong. This option asserts that the breach of Code D of PACE will compel the court to exclude the evidence because of its prejudicial effect. However, under Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), the court has a discretion to exclude prosecution evidence if its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. The use of the word “compel” in this option suggests that exclusion is mandatory whenever there is a breach, which is not the case. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the nature of the breach and its impact on the fairness of the trial. Therefore, Option B is incorrect because it overstates the effect of the breach and does not accurately reflect the court’s discretion.

C. This is correct. The breach of Code D of PACE may lead the court to conclude that the evidence should be excluded if its admission would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. Section 78 of PACE 1984 provides that the court may exclude prosecution evidence if, having regard to all the circumstances, including how the evidence was obtained, its admission would adversely affect the fairness of the trial. In this case, the identification procedure violated Code D, which sets out guidelines to ensure fair and reliable identification evidence. The failure to include sufficient images of individuals with similar facial features (specifically, a visible scar under the right eye) could make the identification process unfairly suggestive and unreliable. The court will consider whether admitting this evidence would compromise the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Therefore, Option C accurately reflects the legal position and is correct.

D. This is wrong. This option claims that the breach of Code D of PACE will not compel the court to exclude the evidence because its admission would not have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. While it’s true that a breach does not automatically result in exclusion, the court must assess whether the breach affects the fairness of the trial. In situations where the identification procedure is flawed—such as failing to ensure that the suspect’s distinguishing features are adequately replicated among the foils—the reliability of the identification evidence is compromised. This can have a significant adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert definitively that the admission would not adversely affect fairness without considering the specific circumstances. Option D is incorrect because it dismisses the potential impact of the breach on the trial’s fairness.

E. This is wrong. This option suggests that the breach of Code D of PACE will compel the court to conclude that the evidence should be excluded and order that the breach must be cured by the police conducting a further video identification procedure in compliance with the Code. While the court may exclude the evidence if it deems it unfair, it does not have the authority to compel the police to conduct a new identification procedure. The decision to conduct further investigative procedures lies with the police and prosecution. Additionally, exclusion is at the court’s discretion under Section 78 of PACE 1984 and is not automatically compelled by a breach. Therefore, Option E is incorrect because it misstates the court’s powers and the consequences of a breach of Code D.

Therefore, the correct answer is C: The breach of Code D of PACE may lead the court to conclude that the evidence should be excluded if its admission would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings.

The correct answer is E.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that the man cannot be found guilty of murder because the doorman’s actions contributed to the victim’s death. In criminal law, for a defendant to be liable for murder, their actions must be a substantial and operative cause of the victim’s death. The chain of causation is not broken by the foreseeably negligent or inappropriate actions of a third party unless those actions are so independent and potent that they render the original act insignificant.

In this case, the doorman’s failure to assist the victim does not break the chain of causation. The doorman’s actions were not so extraordinary or unforeseeable as to absolve the man of liability. The initial attack by the man was the primary cause of the victim’s injuries leading to death. Therefore, the man’s liability for murder remains, and Option A is incorrect.

B. This is wrong. This option suggests that the man cannot be found guilty of murder because death was not an inevitable consequence of his actions. However, the law does not require that death be an inevitable consequence. It is sufficient that the defendant’s actions were a substantial and operative cause of death and that the defendant had the necessary mens rea (mental element) for murder.

In this scenario, the man intended to cause really serious bodily harm (grievous bodily harm), which satisfies the mens rea for murder under the principle established in R v Vickers [1957]. The fact that death was not inevitable does not prevent liability. What matters is that his actions significantly contributed to the death. Therefore, Option B is incorrect.

C. This is wrong. This option claims that the man cannot be found guilty of murder because the victim only died as a result of the life support machine being switched off. According to legal precedent in R v Malcherek and Steel [1981], switching off a life support machine does not break the chain of causation when a victim is already brain dead due to the defendant’s actions. The original assailant remains liable for the death.

The doctors’ decision to switch off life support is seen as a continuation of the natural consequences of the initial injury. Therefore, the man’s liability for murder is not negated by the medical team’s actions. Option C is incorrect.

D. This is wrong. This option states that the man can be found guilty of murder because he is an accomplice to the doorman’s actions which resulted in the victim’s death. This is incorrect because the man is not an accomplice to the doorman’s actions. An accomplice is someone who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commission of a crime by another person.

In this case, the doorman did not commit a criminal offence by failing to assist the victim; negligence or lack of assistance does not make the doorman’s actions criminal in this context. The man’s liability arises from his own direct actions of attacking the victim with intent to cause serious harm. Therefore, Option D is incorrect.

E. This is correct. The man can be found guilty of murder because his conduct was a substantial and operative cause of the victim’s death. For a conviction of murder, the prosecution must prove both the actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind).

Actus Reus: The defendant’s actions must cause the death of the victim. In this case, the man violently attacked the victim, causing massive brain damage. Despite the intervening factors—the doorman’s inaction and the time the victim spent on the pavement—the initial attack was the primary cause of the fatal injuries.

Causation: The chain of causation remains intact unless broken by a novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) that is sufficiently independent and unforeseeable. The doorman’s failure to assist and the medical decision to withdraw life support do not break the chain. The victim’s deterioration was a direct result of the initial attack.

Mens Rea: The man intended to cause really serious bodily harm. Under the principle established in R v Vickers [1957], an intention to cause grievous bodily harm is sufficient mens rea for murder.

Therefore, the man’s conduct was a substantial and operative cause of the victim’s death, and he possessed the necessary mens rea for murder. Option E accurately explains the legal basis for his potential liability.

Therefore, the correct answer is E. The man can be found guilty of murder because his conduct was a substantial and operative cause of the victim’s death.

The correct answer is D.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that the man is not guilty because the unlawful act of destroying the caravan was not itself dangerous to life. In the context of unlawful act manslaughter, the unlawful act must be both unlawful and dangerous. An act is considered dangerous if a sober and reasonable person would recognise that it carries a risk of some harm to another person, albeit not necessarily serious harm, as established in R v Church [1966].

Setting fire to a caravan is inherently dangerous because it poses a risk of harm to anyone who might be inside or nearby. A reasonable person would foresee that igniting a caravan could cause harm to others, especially since caravans can be occupied. Therefore, the unlawful act of arson was dangerous, and Option A is incorrect.

B. This is wrong. This option suggests that the man is not guilty because he did not intend to endanger the life of anyone by destroying the caravan. For unlawful act manslaughter, it is not necessary for the defendant to have intended to cause harm or to have foreseen the risk of harm. What is required is that the defendant intentionally committed an unlawful act that was objectively dangerous and that resulted in death.

In this case, the man intentionally committed arson by setting fire to the caravan, which is a criminal offence under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The fact that he did not contemplate the possibility of harming anyone does not absolve him of liability. The focus is on the dangerousness of the act itself, not on the defendant’s subjective foresight of harm. Therefore, Option B is incorrect.

C. This is wrong. This option claims that he is guilty because he was grossly negligent about harming anyone who might be inside the caravan when he set fire to it. Gross negligence manslaughter requires the existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, that the breach caused death, and that the breach was so gross as to justify criminal liability (R v Adomako [1994]). However, in this scenario, the appropriate category is unlawful act manslaughter, not gross negligence manslaughter, because the man committed an unlawful act (arson) leading to death.

The concept of gross negligence applies where there is no unlawful act but a breach of a duty of care. Since the man committed an intentional unlawful act, gross negligence is not the correct basis for liability here. Therefore, Option C is incorrect.

D. This is correct. The man is guilty because he has committed an unlawful and dangerous act that has killed the woman. The elements required for unlawful act manslaughter are:

(1) An unlawful act: The defendant must commit an act that is a criminal offence. In this case, the man committed arson, which is an offence under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

(2) The act must be dangerous: According to the objective test in R v Church [1966], an act is dangerous if a sober and reasonable person would recognise the risk of some harm resulting from it. Setting fire to a caravan is dangerous because it poses a foreseeable risk of harm to anyone who might be inside or nearby.

(3) The act caused death: There must be a causal link between the unlawful act and the death. The woman’s death was directly caused by the fire set by the man.

(4) Mens rea for the unlawful act: The defendant must have the necessary mental element for the unlawful act. The man intended to destroy property unlawfully, satisfying the mens rea for arson.

Therefore, all the elements of unlawful act manslaughter are present, making Option D correct.

E. This is wrong. This option states that he is guilty because he was reckless about harming anyone who might be inside the caravan when he set fire to it. While recklessness pertains to the defendant’s foresight of a risk, for unlawful act manslaughter, the focus is on committing an unlawful and dangerous act rather than the defendant’s subjective recklessness regarding causing harm.

The required mental state is the mens rea for the unlawful act itself (arson), not recklessness as to causing harm or death. Since the man did not give any thought to whether someone might be inside, there is no evidence of recklessness regarding harming a person. Therefore, Option E is incorrect because it misstates the necessary mens rea for unlawful act manslaughter in this context.

Therefore, the correct answer is D. The man is guilty because he has committed an unlawful and dangerous act that has killed the woman. His intentional act of arson was unlawful and dangerous, and it directly caused the woman’s death, satisfying all the elements for unlawful act manslaughter.