The correct answer is B.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. The terms on the leaflet are considered an invitation to treat, not an offer. When the website designers sent the leaflet with their standard terms, they were inviting potential clients to make an offer to them. The architect's subsequent request for a quotation does not constitute acceptance of an offer but rather is a step in negotiations.

B. This is correct. The quotation from the website designers constitutes an offer to the architect to design the website for £2,500 under their standard terms and conditions. The architect accepted this offer by signing and returning the tear-off slip, which explicitly stated that he accepted the quotation on the website designers’ standard terms and conditions. This forms a binding contract on those terms.

C. This is wrong. Although the architect sent his own standard terms and conditions when he wrote to the website designers, the final and decisive act was his acceptance of the quotation on the website designers' terms. By signing and returning the tear-off slip that specified acceptance on their standard terms, he effectively agreed to their terms, not his own.

D. This is wrong. The letter from the architect, including his own standard terms, could be seen as an offer or possibly a counter-offer. However, the website designers did not accept this offer simply by sending a quotation; rather, they made a new offer with their quotation. The acceptance occurred when the architect returned the signed tear-off slip.

E. This is wrong. The architect's letter could be interpreted as a counter-offer, but the website designers did not accept it by sending the quotation. Instead, they made a new offer with their quotation on their own terms. The acceptance was made by the architect when he signed and returned the tear-off slip agreeing to the website designers' terms.

The answer is B. The quotation from the website designers constituted an offer, which the architect accepted on the website designers’ standard terms and conditions by signing and returning the tear-off slip. This acceptance formed a binding contract on those terms.

C. The bank, because the trade supplier’s failure to register its charge makes the charge void against the administrator and the bank.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. Under the Companies Act 2006, specifically sections 859A to 859Q, if a company fails to register a charge at Companies House within 21 days of its creation, the charge becomes void against a liquidator, administrator, and any creditor of the company. However, the charge remains valid between the company and the trade supplier. Therefore, the failure to register the charge does not make it void against the company, but it does make it void against the administrator and other creditors like the bank.

B. This is wrong. Actual or constructive notice of an unregistered charge does not protect the unregistered charge against other creditors or an administrator. The requirement to register charges is designed to provide public notice, and failure to do so cannot be remedied by actual notice to specific parties. Therefore, even though the bank was informed about the trade supplier’s charge, the trade supplier’s failure to register its charge means it is void against the administrator and the bank.

C. This is correct. Since the trade supplier did not register its floating charge within the required 21-day period, the charge is void against the administrator and any creditors, including the bank. The bank, however, registered its floating charge immediately after execution, making it valid and enforceable. Therefore, the bank's registered floating charge takes priority over the trade supplier's unregistered charge, regardless of the order in which they were created.

D. This is wrong. While there are provisions under the Insolvency Act 1986 that allow certain transactions made within a specified period before insolvency to be set aside (e.g., transactions at an undervalue, preferences), a floating charge created in favour of a lender (like a bank) for new money lent is generally valid, even if created within 12 months before insolvency. Moreover, there is no indication that the bank's charge is vulnerable under these provisions, so the timing alone does not give the trade supplier priority.

E. This is wrong. The priority of floating charges is not determined solely by their dates of creation. Registration is a crucial factor. An earlier floating charge that is unregistered is void against an administrator and creditors, whereas a later floating charge that is properly registered is valid and takes priority. Therefore, the trade supplier's earlier but unregistered charge does not have priority over the bank's later but registered charge.

The answer is C. The bank has a prior claim to the company's assets because the trade supplier's failure to register its floating charge renders it void against the administrator and any creditor, including the bank. Therefore, the bank's registered floating charge takes priority over the trade supplier's unregistered floating charge.

The correct answer is D.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. Under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Part 31, a document is considered to be within a party's control if it is in their physical possession, they have the right to possess it, or they have the right to inspect or copy it. In this case, the letter is in the possession of the claimant's solicitor, which means it is within the claimant's control. Therefore, the claimant cannot claim a right to withhold inspection on the basis that the letter is no longer in their control.

B. This is wrong. Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between a client and their legal adviser (solicitor or barrister) made for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice. The financial adviser in this scenario is independent and not a legal adviser. Communications with third parties who are not legal advisers do not attract legal advice privilege. Therefore, the letter is not subject to legal advice privilege.

C. This is wrong. While proportionality is a key principle in disclosure, it pertains to the extent of the search for documents, not the right to withhold inspection of a specific document already disclosed. Under CPR Part 31.3, a party cannot refuse inspection of a document on the grounds of proportionality once it has been identified as relevant and disclosed. Therefore, it is not valid to withhold inspection on the basis that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the case.

D. This is correct. Litigation privilege applies to confidential communications between a client (or their lawyer) and a third party, where the dominant purpose of the communication is to obtain information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation. Here, the letter was written by an independent financial adviser to the claimant's managing director with the sole purpose of advising on drafting the letter before claim in the present litigation. This means the letter was created for the dominant purpose of contemplated litigation, and therefore, it is subject to litigation privilege. The claimant can rightfully withhold inspection of the letter on this basis.

E. This is wrong. The fact that a document was written after the cause of action accrued does not, by itself, provide a basis to withhold inspection. Unless a document is privileged or there is another valid reason, it must be disclosed and made available for inspection regardless of when it was created. Therefore, the timing of the letter's creation does not grant the claimant the right to withhold inspection.

The answer is D. The claimant can claim a right to withhold inspection of the letter because it is subject to litigation privilege. The letter is a confidential communication between the claimant and a third party (the financial adviser), made for the sole purpose of obtaining advice in connection with contemplated litigation against the defendant. Therefore, it is protected under litigation privilege, allowing the claimant to withhold it from inspection.

The correct answer is C.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. At the time the contract was signed, the company was not yet incorporated and therefore did not have a separate legal personality. Under the Companies Act 2006, a company comes into existence upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation. Since the company did not exist when the contract was made, it cannot be a party to the contract, and thus, the benefit of the contract does not reside with the company.

B. This is wrong. The shareholders did not enter into the contract, nor were they parties to it. The contract was negotiated and signed by the enthusiast in his own name, on behalf of the yet-to-be-formed company. Shareholders benefit from contracts made by the company, not from contracts made personally by individuals before the company's incorporation. Therefore, the benefit of the contract does not reside with the shareholders.

C. This is correct. Under section 51 of the Companies Act 2006, when a person purports to act on behalf of a company that is not yet formed, that person is personally liable on the contract unless there is an agreement to the contrary. The contract was signed by the enthusiast in his own name, on behalf of the company, before the receipt of the certificate of incorporation. Therefore, the benefit and burden of the contract reside with the enthusiast personally. He is entitled to enforce the contract and is also liable under it.

D. This is wrong. The company and the enthusiast cannot jointly hold the benefit of the contract because the company did not exist at the time the contract was made. As previously mentioned, the company cannot be a party to a contract formed before its incorporation. Therefore, there is no joint benefit between the enthusiast and the company; the benefit resides solely with the enthusiast.

E. This is wrong. The contract is not void; it is a valid and enforceable contract between the enthusiast and the provider of cycling clothing. The fact that the enthusiast signed the contract on behalf of a non-existent company means he is personally bound by it under section 51 of the Companies Act 2006. Therefore, the benefit (and the burden) of the contract resides with the enthusiast, and it is not void.

The answer is C. The enthusiast personally holds the benefit of the contract because he entered into the contract before the company was incorporated, and the company did not have legal existence at that time. Under section 51 of the Companies Act 2006, he is personally liable and entitled under the contract made on behalf of a company not yet formed.

The correct answer is C.

Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. Under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), specifically Section 7(1), only a person who is a victim of an alleged unlawful act can bring proceedings against a public authority. The HRA does not specifically grant standing to family representatives who are not themselves victims of the infringement. Therefore, the cousin cannot bring legal proceedings solely based on being a family member. B. This is wrong. The HRA does not provide that proceedings may be brought by a representative where anonymity is a serious concern for the victim. While courts can take measures to protect the identity of a claimant (e.g., anonymity orders), this does not extend to allowing a non-victim to bring proceedings on behalf of the victim solely due to concerns about publicity. Therefore, the cousin cannot bring proceedings on this basis. C. This is correct. According to Section 7(1) of the HRA, only a victim of an alleged breach of the Convention rights can bring proceedings under the Act. The term “victim” is interpreted in line with Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which requires that the applicant must be directly affected by the alleged violation. Since the cousin is not a victim—she has not been directly affected by the infringement—she lacks the necessary standing to bring an action under the HRA. D. This is wrong. The ability to meet the expenses of the proceedings does not grant standing to bring a claim under the HRA. The court's satisfaction with a representative's financial means is irrelevant to the issue of standing. The key requirement is that the claimant must be a victim of the alleged infringement, which the cousin is not. E. This is wrong. While there are provisions for representative actions in certain contexts, such as group litigation orders where multiple individuals have identical or similar claims, this does not apply here. Under the HRA, a representative cannot bring an action unless they are a victim or in certain limited circumstances (e.g., acting on behalf of a victim who is incapable). The cousin cannot bring an action simply because multiple individuals might have similar claims. The answer is C. Only a victim of an alleged infringement of Convention rights can bring proceedings under the Human Rights Act 1998. Since the cousin is not directly affected and is not a victim, she does not have standing to bring legal proceedings on behalf of the woman. Therefore, the cousin cannot bring legal proceedings under the HRA in this situation.

The correct answer is D. Let us go through these and explain. A. This is wrong. While directors generally have the authority to manage the company's business under the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, certain transactions require shareholder approval despite this general authority. Under the Companies Act 2006, specifically Section 190, if a company proposes to enter into an arrangement whereby a director or a connected person acquires from the company a substantial non-cash asset, the transaction must be approved by the shareholders. Since the purchaser is the father of one of the directors (a connected person), and the transaction involves a substantial non-cash asset, the directors' general authority does not override the need for shareholder approval.

B. This is wrong. The fact that the transaction involves a non-cash asset (the land) does not exempt it from requiring shareholder approval. In fact, Section 190 of the Companies Act 2006 specifically addresses transactions involving substantial non-cash assets between a company and its directors or connected persons. Therefore, the nature of the asset as non-cash is a reason why shareholder approval is required, not a reason why it is not. C. This is wrong. Selling the asset at its fair market value does not negate the requirement for shareholder approval under the Companies Act 2006. Section 190 applies regardless of whether the transaction is at market value, undervalue, or overvalue. The key factors are the nature of the asset (substantial non-cash asset) and the relationship between the parties (director or connected person), not the fairness of the price. D. This is correct. Under Section 190 of the Companies Act 2006, a company must obtain shareholder approval before entering into an arrangement where a director or a connected person acquires from the company a substantial non-cash asset. A connected person includes immediate family members, such as a parent of a director. According to Section 191, an asset is considered substantial if it exceeds £100,000 or is more than 10% of the company's net asset value and exceeds £5,000. The company's net assets are £600,000.

10% of £600,000 is £60,000.

The land is valued at £70,000, which exceeds both £5,000 and the 10% threshold. Therefore, the land is a substantial non-cash asset, and since the purchaser is a connected person, shareholder approval is required for the transaction. E. This is wrong. The fact that the company's directors are also shareholders does not, in itself, mandate shareholder approval for the transaction. The requirement for shareholder approval arises from the nature of the transaction under Section 190 of the Companies Act 2006, not from the overlap between directors and shareholders. Moreover, even if all shareholders are directors, formal shareholder approval is still required to comply with statutory obligations.

The answer is D. Shareholder approval is necessary because the transaction involves the sale of land—a substantial non-cash asset valued at £70,000, which exceeds 10% of the company's net asset value—to a connected person (the father of a director). Under Sections 190 and 191 of the Companies Act 2006, such transactions require approval by the company's shareholders.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that an identification procedure would serve a useful purpose because the witness viewed the burglary via a CCTV camera which failed to record the incident. While it is true that the CCTV did not record the incident, the key issue is whether the witness’s identification needs to be tested through an identification procedure. According to PACE Code D, paragraph 3.12, an identification procedure is required when the suspect is not known to the witness or when the witness’s identification of the suspect is in doubt. In this case, the witness claims to know the suspect personally, having worked with him until a year ago. Therefore, an identification procedure would not serve a useful purpose merely because the CCTV did not record the incident. Option A incorrectly suggests that the absence of CCTV footage necessitates an identification procedure, making it incorrect.

B. This is correct. The man is known to the witness, who states that he recognised the offender as someone who used to work in his bar. According to PACE Code D, paragraph 3.12, an identification procedure need not be held if it would serve no useful purpose, such as when the suspect is known to the witness. The purpose of an identification procedure is to test the ability of a witness to identify a suspect they do not know. When a witness claims to recognise someone they know, and there is no doubt about the identity of that person, an identification procedure is unnecessary. In this scenario, the witness provided the name of the suspect to the police, and there is no indication that the identification is mistaken or that the suspect’s identity is in doubt. Therefore, Option B correctly states that an identification procedure would not serve a useful purpose because the man is known to the witness.

C. This is wrong. This option suggests that an identification procedure would serve a useful purpose because the man is known to the police. The fact that the man is known to the police is irrelevant to the necessity of an identification procedure. Identification procedures are concerned with the witness’s ability to identify the suspect, not whether the police are familiar with the suspect. The purpose is to test the reliability of the witness’s identification of someone they do not know. Since the witness knows the suspect, and there is no question about the suspect’s identity, an identification procedure is unnecessary. Therefore, Option C is incorrect.

D. This is wrong. This option claims that an identification procedure would not serve a useful purpose because the lighting at the time of the offence was poor. While poor lighting conditions can affect the reliability of a witness’s identification, it does not negate the need for an identification procedure if the suspect is unknown to the witness. However, in this case, the witness knows the suspect personally. The issue of poor lighting might affect the credibility of the witness’s identification in court, but it does not determine the necessity of an identification procedure under PACE Code D. Therefore, Option D incorrectly states the reason an identification procedure would not be useful, making it incorrect.

E. This is wrong. This option asserts that an identification procedure would not serve a useful purpose because the distance between the jewellery shop and the bar was too great. Similar to Option D, while distance can impact the reliability of a witness’s observation, it does not eliminate the requirement for an identification procedure if the suspect is unknown to the witness. In this case, the witness knows the suspect, and there is no indication that the distance prevented him from recognising the suspect. The necessity of an identification procedure is determined by whether the suspect is known to the witness and whether the identification needs to be tested. Therefore, Option E is incorrect.

The correct answer is A.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is correct.

Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, specifically Sections 189 to 193, the court may suspend a custodial sentence for a specified operational period. If the offender commits another offence during the operational period, the court has the authority to activate the suspended custodial sentence.

In this case, the man was given a suspended sentence order (SSO) of six months’ custody with an operational period of 12 months. He committed a new offence of criminal damage one month ago, which falls within the operational period of the suspended sentence. According to Section 191(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, if an offender breaches any requirement of an SSO or commits another offence during the operational period, the court must consider whether to activate the suspended sentence.Section 189(7) stipulates that the court must activate the suspended sentence unless it would be unjust to do so in all the circumstances. The fact that the man has committed a new offence during the operational period provides grounds for the Magistrates’ Court to activate the custodial sentence. Therefore, Option A is correct because the man has breached the conditions of his suspended sentence by committing an offence during the operational period.

B. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the court cannot activate the custodial sentence because the new offence is non-imprisonable. However, criminal damage is generally an offence that can carry a custodial sentence. Under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, the basic offence of criminal damage is triable either way and can result in imprisonment. Even if the offence were non-imprisonable, the key point is that the offender has committed an offence during the operational period.

The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 do not require the new offence to be imprisonable for the court to activate the suspended sentence. Section 191(1) allows the court to deal with the offender if he commits any offence during the operational period. Therefore, Option B is incorrect.

C. This is wrong.

This option claims that the custodial sentence cannot be activated because the man has completed the requirement attached to the suspended sentence order, namely, the 80 hours of unpaid work. However, completing the requirements of the SSO does not negate the operational period nor does it protect the offender from activation of the suspended sentence if a new offence is committed during that period.

The operational period is separate from any requirements imposed. It is the period during which the offender must not commit any further offences. Committing a new offence during the operational period breaches the conditions of the suspended sentence, regardless of whether the requirements have been completed. Therefore, Option C is incorrect because completion of the unpaid work does not prevent the court from activating the custodial sentence due to the new offence.

D. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the court cannot activate the custodial sentence because the operational period of the suspended sentence order is still running. This is a misunderstanding of the law. The operational period is the time during which the suspended sentence hangs over the offender and serves as a deterrent against committing further offences.

If the offender commits another offence during the operational period, the court has the power to activate the suspended sentence. The fact that the operational period is still running is precisely why the court can activate the sentence. Therefore, Option D is incorrect because it misstates the effect of the operational period under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

E. This is wrong.

This option asserts that the court can activate the custodial sentence because the man has committed an offence within the six-month period of custody imposed. However, the relevant period for activation of the suspended sentence is the operational period, not the length of the suspended custodial sentence itself.

In this case, the operational period is 12 months. The six-month custody term is suspended for that 12-month operational period. The offender committed the new offence during the operational period, which is the grounds for activation. Therefore, Option E is incorrect because it confuses the custodial term with the operational period.

The answer is A. Yes, because the man has committed an offence during the operational period of the suspended sentence order.

Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court may activate a suspended sentence if the offender commits any offence during the operational period. The fact that the man committed an offence of criminal damage within the 12-month operational period means the Magistrates’ Court can activate the custodial sentence. The completion of the unpaid work requirement does not prevent activation, nor does the nature of the new offence (imprisonable or not) alter the court’s authority in this regard.

The correct answer is E.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that a replacement trustee must be appointed because some of the beneficiaries are still under the age of 18. While it is true that there are beneficiaries who are minors, there is no legal requirement mandating the appointment of an additional trustee solely because beneficiaries are under 18. The existing trustees have the authority to manage the trust assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries, including minors. The presence of underage beneficiaries does not, in itself, necessitate the appointment of a replacement trustee. Therefore, Option A is incorrect.

B. This is wrong. This option suggests that a replacement trustee must be appointed because three trustees were originally appointed and there are now only two trustees. Under trust law, unless the trust instrument stipulates a minimum number of trustees, there is no obligation to maintain the original number of trustees. The Trustee Act 1925 allows trusts to continue with fewer trustees than originally appointed, provided there is at least one trustee remaining. In this case, the trust instrument does not require a specific number of trustees, and two trustees are sufficient to administer the trust. Therefore, Option B is incorrect.

C. This is wrong. This option claims there is no requirement to appoint a replacement trustee because the trust came into effect after the man’s death and not during his lifetime. The timing of the trust’s creation—whether it is a will trust (testamentary trust) or a trust created during the settlor’s lifetime (inter vivos trust)—is irrelevant to the necessity of appointing a replacement trustee. The key factors are the number of remaining trustees and the nature of the trust property. Since the trust is ongoing and there are surviving trustees capable of administering it, the origin of the trust does not affect the need for a replacement trustee. Therefore, Option C is incorrect.

D. This is wrong. This option asserts that there is no requirement to appoint a replacement trustee because there is no land in the trust investments. While it is true that certain statutory requirements mandate a minimum number of trustees when land is involved (for example, the requirement for at least two trustees to give a valid receipt for the proceeds of sale of land under Section 14(2) of the Trustee Act 1925), these requirements do not apply to trusts that do not include land. However, the absence of land is not, by itself, a reason to conclude that a replacement trustee is unnecessary. The correct reasoning involves considering the number of surviving trustees and whether they can continue to administer the trust effectively. Therefore, Option D is incorrect.

E. This is correct. There is no requirement to appoint a new trustee because there are two surviving trustees. Under the Trustee Act 1925 and general trust law principles, a trust can be properly administered as long as there is at least one trustee unless the trust instrument specifies a minimum number. Since the trust fund consists of personal property (a portfolio of shares) and not land, there is no statutory requirement for a minimum number of trustees. The two surviving trustees are capable of continuing to administer the trust for the benefit of the remaining minor beneficiaries. Therefore, no replacement trustee is necessary, and Option E correctly describes the situation.

The answer is E. There is no requirement to appoint a new trustee because there are two surviving trustees. The trust can continue to be administered effectively by the two remaining trustees without the need for an additional appointment.

The correct answer is B.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong. This option states that the executor must wait for two months from the date of the grant of probate before distributing the estate after placing the advertisements. This is incorrect because the protection afforded to executors under Section 27 of the Trustee Act 1925 depends on waiting for a specified period from the date of the advertisements, not from the date of the grant of probate. The executor does not need to wait for the grant of probate to place the advertisements; in fact, it is common practice to advertise as soon as possible to start the protection period. Therefore, Option A incorrectly specifies the starting point of the waiting period and is incorrect.

B. This is correct. Under Section 27 of the Trustee Act 1925, an executor can protect himself against claims from unknown creditors by placing advertisements in the London Gazette and in a newspaper circulating in the area where any land belonging to the deceased is situated. The notices must specify a reasonable time (usually at least two months from the date of the advertisements) within which creditors and claimants can send in their claims. After this period has expired, the executor can distribute the estate without being personally liable to any creditor or claimant of whom he had no notice at the time of distribution. Therefore, Option B correctly states that the executor should place the advertisements and must wait for two months from the date of the advertisements before distributing the estate to ensure protection against unknown claims.

C. This is wrong. This option suggests that the executor must wait for two months from the date of death before distributing the estate after placing the advertisements. This is incorrect because the waiting period for protection under Section 27 begins from the date of the advertisements, not from the date of death. Waiting two months from the date of death without placing the advertisements does not fulfil the statutory requirements for protection against unknown creditors. Therefore, Option C misunderstands the starting point of the waiting period and is incorrect.

D. This is wrong. This option states that the executor must wait for two months from the date of death before placing the advertisements. This is incorrect because there is no requirement to wait any specific period after the death before placing the advertisements. In fact, it is advisable for the executor to place the advertisements as soon as practicable to start the protection period. Delaying the advertisements serves no purpose and may unnecessarily prolong the administration of the estate. Therefore, Option D is incorrect.

E. This is wrong. This option suggests that the executor must wait for two months from the date of the grant of probate before placing the advertisements. This is incorrect because the executor does not need to wait for the grant of probate to place the advertisements under Section 27. The advertisements can and should be placed as soon as possible to initiate the protection period against unknown creditors. Waiting for two months after obtaining the grant of probate before advertising would delay the administration process without any legal requirement to do so. Therefore, Option E is incorrect.

The answer is B. He should place the advertisements and must wait for two months from the date of the advertisements before distributing the estate. This option accurately reflects the procedure under Section 27 of the Trustee Act 1925, which allows executors to protect themselves from unknown claims by advertising for creditors and waiting a specified period (typically two months) from the date of the advertisements before distributing the estate.

The correct answer is D.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is wrong.

This option suggests that the testator’s ex-spouse, the testator’s friend, and the nephew of the son have the best right to apply for a grant of representation. However, this is incorrect for several reasons:

Ex-Spouse: Under Section 18A of the Wills Act 1837 (as amended by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989), any appointment of a spouse as an executor or beneficiary in a will is revoked upon divorce, unless a contrary intention appears in the will. In this case, there is no indication of such intention. Therefore, the ex-spouse’s appointment as executor is revoked, and she no longer has the right to apply.

Nephew of the Son: The son predeceased the testator, which means his appointment as executor lapsed upon his death. An executor’s appointment cannot be transmitted to their personal representatives unless the executor had obtained probate before their death, which is not the case here. The nephew obtained a grant of probate to the son’s estate but has no right to act as executor of the testator’s estate.

Therefore, neither the ex-spouse nor the nephew of the son has the right to apply, making Option A incorrect.

B. This is wrong.

This option includes the testator’s friend and the testator’s niece. While the testator’s friend is a surviving executor named in the will and has the right to apply, the niece’s position is different:

Testator’s Niece: Although she is the sole beneficiary under the will, beneficiaries do not have the right to apply for a grant of probate when there is a surviving executor willing and able to act. Beneficiaries may apply for a grant of letters of administration with the will annexed only if there are no executors willing or able to act.

Since the friend is willing and able to act as executor, the niece does not have the best right to apply at this stage. Therefore, Option B is incorrect.

C. This is wrong.

This option lists the testator’s friend, the nephew of the son, and the testator’s niece. As previously established:

Nephew of the Son: Has no right to apply because the son’s appointment as executor lapsed upon his death before the testator’s death, and executorship does not pass to personal representatives unless the executor had obtained probate.

Testator’s Niece: Does not have the right to apply when there is a surviving executor willing to act.

Therefore, including the nephew and the niece alongside the friend is incorrect, making Option C wrong.

D. This is correct.

The testator’s friend only has the best right to apply for a grant of representation. This is because:

Surviving Executor: The friend is the sole surviving executor named in the will who is willing and able to act.

Legal Standing: Under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, executors named in the will have the primary right to apply for probate. Since the other two named executors (the ex-spouse and the son) are no longer able to act (due to revocation and death, respectively), the friend holds the exclusive right.

No Other Competitors: There are no other individuals with a superior or equal right to apply. The niece, as a beneficiary, does not have priority over a named executor who is prepared to act.

Therefore, Option D is the correct answer.

E. This is wrong.

This option includes the testator’s friend and the nephew of the son. As already explained:

Nephew of the Son: He has no legal right to act as executor of the testator’s estate. The son’s appointment lapsed upon his death before the testator, and executorship does not transfer to personal representatives unless the executor had proved the will (i.e., obtained probate) before dying. Therefore, including the nephew alongside the friend is incorrect, making Option E wrong.

The answer is D. The testator’s friend only.

He is the sole surviving executor named in the will who is willing and able to act, giving him the best right to apply for a grant of representation to the testator’s estate under probate law. Neither the ex-spouse nor the nephew nor the niece have a superior right in these circumstances.

The correct answer is A.

Let us go through these and explain.

A. This is correct.

According to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) Code of Conduct, solicitors have a fundamental duty to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice (Principle 1). They must not mislead or assist in misleading the court (Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs, and RFLs, Paragraph 1.4).

In this scenario, the client has deliberately provided false information to the court regarding her address and date of birth to conceal previous convictions. Upon realising this, the solicitor must take immediate action to avoid being complicit in the deception. Continuing to act for the client would mean facilitating the client’s misconduct, which is a breach of professional obligations.

While solicitors also owe duties of confidentiality to their clients (Principle 6), the duty to the court takes precedence when there is a conflict. However, the solicitor cannot disclose the client’s confidential information without consent. Therefore, the appropriate course of action is to cease to act immediately without disclosing the client’s wrongdoing to the court. This action ensures that the solicitor does not further the client’s deception while avoiding a breach of confidentiality.

B. This is wrong.

Choosing not to mention the client’s character or previous convictions does not address the fundamental issue that the client has actively misled the court. The solicitor has a positive duty not to mislead the court, which includes a duty to correct any misleading information if possible. Ignoring the false information and proceeding with the plea in mitigation allows the deception to continue, making the solicitor complicit in misleading the court.

C. This is wrong.

While the solicitor must not mislead the court, they also have a duty of confidentiality to the client (Principle 6; Code of Conduct, Paragraph 6.3). Disclosing the client’s confidential information without consent breaches this duty. The solicitor cannot unilaterally correct the information provided by the client without first obtaining the client’s permission. Doing so would violate the client’s trust and confidentiality, leading to potential professional misconduct.

D. This is wrong.

Implying that the client is of good character when the solicitor knows this to be false is actively misleading the court. This conduct breaches the solicitor’s duty to act with integrity and uphold the proper administration of justice (Principle 1; Code of Conduct, Paragraph 1.4). Making misleading statements or implications about the client’s character exacerbates the deception and could result in serious professional consequences for the solicitor, including disciplinary action.

E. This is wrong.

While this option seems appropriate in encouraging the client to rectify the falsehood, the immediacy and seriousness of the client’s deception require prompt action. The client has already misled the court, and the solicitor is now aware of this misconduct. The solicitor’s duty to the court takes precedence, and they must not be party to the deception for any longer than necessary. Therefore, the solicitor should cease to act immediately without attempting to persuade the client to correct the information, as any delay could further implicate the solicitor in the misconduct.

The correct answer is A: Cease to act immediately.

By ceasing to act immediately, the solicitor upholds their duty to the court and avoids being complicit in the client’s deception. This action aligns with professional obligations under the SRA Principles and Code of Conduct, ensuring the integrity of the legal profession and the proper administration of justice.